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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RATIONAL ENERGY
CHOICES
STEVEN FERREY*
I. IF THERE IS AN ENERGY CRISIS, WHY HAVE CORPORATIONS NOT
IMPLEMENTED RENEWABLE ENERGY AND SELF-GENERATION?
Supposedly there is a shortage of energy.' Primary fuels, such as
gasoline, heating oil, and natural gas, as well as carrier sources of energy,
such as electricity, are selling for some of the highest prices in a gen-
eration.2 If there is a shortage or even a crisis on the horizon, why have
American corporations not moved faster to implement renewable energy
and self-generation? Economic, legal, and regulatory disincentives to
such implementation provide the initial answer, but there have also been
mixed signals from regulatory agencies. Amid these disincentives and
mixed signals, corporations have acted relatively rationally on a short-
term planning horizon, but they will soon feel new pressure to reduce
their "carbon footprints" by utilizing renewable energy sources.
Some disincentives are price related, in that generating electricity
from photovoltaic panels ("PV") is several times more expensive for the
corporation than buying traditional, centrally-generated electricity.3 To
justify such investments, corporations must lengthen their planning
horizon. With the increasing costs of conventional power, the innovative
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston; Visiting Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School, 2003. Professor Ferrey consults with many corporations on energy
investments, and advises the World Bank on international renewable energy programs.
1See EnergyShortage.Com, Welcome, http://www.energyshortage.com (last visited Dec.
1, 2006) (discussing the supposed energy shortage).
2See Oil Price Increases of 2004-2006, httpJ/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil-prices (last visited
Aug. 24,2006) (documenting how the price of oil and gasoline have reached "record highs"
during the past year); Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Prices,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng-pri-sumdcunus m.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006)
(discussing rising natural gas prices); Edison Electric Institute, Rising Electricity Costs,
http://www.eei.org/industry-issues/electricity-policy/state andlocal-policies/rising-el
ectricity-costs/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
3 See DOE Offers $170 Million in Solar Funds, Aiming to Cut PVCost to 9-18 Cents/Kwh,
PLATS ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 10, 2006, at 11. As of 2006, PV power costs range from
13-22 ¢/h. Id. Traditional fossil fuels produce power at about 3-6 0/h, depending on heat
rate and fossil fuel costs. See infra note 63.
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financing structures offered by some companies,4 and various tax and
other incentives, 5 on-site generation can make economic sense on a long-
term basis. Fuel cells, powered by hydrogen, are less cost-effective.6 Wind
power is cost-competitive with traditional electricity production.' Biomass,
trash-to-energy, and landfill-gas electric energy resources or projects are
not inherently available at most corporate sites.8 Their implementation
requires being in the right place at the right time, often demands sig-
nificant land areas, and is neither the province of nor available to most
American corporations.9
A fundamental dichotomy exists between the availability and
attributes of on-site renewable energy technologies. Some technologies
are base-load, stable and generally available around-the-clock renewable
technologies. These include biomass and landfill gas-to-energy projects. 0
However, these base-load projects are not universally distributed.
Landfills occur only in places where garbage has been accumulated in a
substantial quantity over time, and biomass projects involve the trans-
port and processing of organic or agricultural matter." Thus, these
technologies are not inherently available at most locations for commercial
or industrial customers. On the other hand, certain renewable tech-
nologies are universally distributed. Solar photovoltaic energy is available
everywhere in the United States, 2 and many locations have harnessable
wind energy. 3 However, these universally distributed renewable energy
technologies are intermittent. 14 Wind power may only be available during
twenty-five to forty percent of the hours in a month, and solar photovol-
taic energy is available less than half the hours of the day. 15 For on-site
4 See 1 STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 3:56, at 3-139 to -41 (24th ed.
2006) [hereinafter FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER].
' See id. § 3:53 (discussing tax incentives).
" See id. § 2:14, § 10:144, at 10-357 to -58.
'See id. § 2:11, at 2-29 to -30.
'Id. at 2-35 to -36.
9 This is not to say that these don't make sense on a larger societal scale, but the trash-to-
energy and landfill-gas resource potential in the nation have largely been overlooked
during the last couple of decades. See Environmental Protection Agency, Landfill Meth-
ane Outreach Program (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.epa.gov/lmop.
10 FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 2:11, at 2-35 to -36.
"See id.
12 See id. § 2:11, at 2-26 to -28 & fig. 2.11 (giving a map of distributed solar resources).
13 See id. § 2:11, at 2-28 to -34 & fig. 2.12.
14 See id. § 2:11, at 2-23 to -34.
"8 See id. § 2:11, at 2-26, 2-30.
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energy applications, these intermittent technologies require either on-
site energy storage, 6 or the ability to sell surplus electricity to the
regional power grid'7 and purchase back-up and stand-by power when
required from the grid'" or from other independent producers over the
grid.'9 Therefore, renewable power has to be tailored to the specific
application. While renewable technologies can stand alone, the modern
corporation would do best to adopt them in conjunction with existing
conventional grid-supplied power service.
Based strictly on economics and rational decision-making, renew-
able energy generation on-site does not lend itself to use by every
corporation, a situation that provides one rational explanation for the
lack of implementation of some renewable energy technologies. More-
over, while it is possible to buy so-called "green" energy resources from
traditional energy suppliers, ° in many cases such purchases do not
increase the total amount of renewable energy. When a purchaser buys
"green" energy, the allocation of renewable energy resources in the
system to that dedicated purchaser only occurs on paper.2' But that
allocation does not necessarily result in any more use or deployment of
centralized renewable energy resources.22 In fact, in California, the
demand for purchasing "green" centralized energy resources actually
caused traditional purveyors of those energy resources to operate fossil
fuel-fired facilities more than they otherwise would have.2"
16 See id. § 2:20.
17 Id. §§ 4:24-:29 (discussing renewable power sales).
'
8 See id. §§ 4:32-:33 (discussing backup power sales).
'
9 See id. § 4:27 (discussing net metering).20 See id. § 10:98 (discussing "green" energy sources).
21 These are electric supply derived, at least on paper, from renewable resources.
Particular power for sale over the common electric grid cannot be physically isolated for
a particular buyer. See STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET
REGULATION 11 (2000) [hereinafter FERREY, THE NEW RULES]; See also ENvTL. MKTG.
SUBCOMM. OF THE ENERGY DEREGULATION WORKING GROUP, NAT'L ASS'N ATTys GEN.,
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING GUIDELINES FOR ELECTRICITY 6 (1999), available at http:ll
www.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/pdfs/naag_0100.pdf.
2 See FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra. note 21, at 11.
See NANCY RADER, GREEN BUYERS BEWARE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF'GREEN ELEcTRICITY'
Part II.A (1998). This is because the renewable energy resources available today, largely
in the form of hydroelectric power and wind, were already constructed as part of the
generation portfolio and had a very low, or zero, marginal cost of operation. Id. Therefore,
the owner of those resources would deploy them whenever available to minimize
marginal system operating costs. Selling those "green" energy resource outputs to a
particular buyer did not cause the renewable energy generation technology to operate
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The disincentives to on-site renewable resources deployed directly
by corporations go beyond economic considerations, however. There are
significant impediments to interconnection, obtaining stand-by and back-
up power from the utility, and integrating on-site renewable energy
resources with the conventional system.24 These additional disincentives
overwhelm and discourage many corporations from deploying renewable
resources." These regulatory and legal disincentives are as pivotal as
price. The system provides many disincentives, both subtle and obvious,
for an individual corporation to deploy renewable energy resources.
Some renewable applications and many on-site distributed
resource generation applications are nonetheless extremely economical
for a large range of American corporations today.26 Renewable energy
resources may make sense in certain deployments: photovoltaics can be
cost-effective in long-term applications, with subsidies, or in remote or
specialized situations." These specialized situations are often utilized as
"demonstration" applications in other than remote situations." Wind
power is economical, but may pose siting problems at a particular
corporate location29 or present difficulties with integrating an intermit-
tent resource with the grid. 3' The corporate decision-making horizon is
often three to seven years, not the ten plus years that might be required
to recover the financial investment on a solar photovoltaic system.31
Because they are not reliable when the wind is not blowing or the sun
any more when more customers signed up; since it was already running the plant at
maximum levels so as to minimize portfolio operating costs, the purveyor would have to
deploy more of its traditional fossil fuel-fired electric generation resources to meet the
increased demand from new customers. Id. Therefore, while renewable power resources
are allocated on paper to purchasers of "green" power, the traditional energy resources
actually operate more. Id.
24 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, §§ 4:32-:33.
25 See id. §§ 4:34-:35.
26 See generally id. § 10:144 (discussing distributed generation).
27 See id. §§ 3:53, 2:11 at 2-26 to -28.
28 See id.
' The author has completed a legal assessment of the impediments to siting and
developing wind power (sources on file with author, article forthcoming 2007).30 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, §2:11, at 2-28 to -34.
3 See generally DAvE ALGOSO, MARY BRAUN, & BERNADETTE DEL CHIARO, BRINGING
SOLAR TO SCALE: CALIFORNIA'S OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE A THRIVING, SELF-SUSTAINING
RESIDENTIAL SOLAR MARKET 22-23 (2005), available at http://www.environmentcalifornia
.org/uploads/CG/RN/CGRNi2aeOwalDGcyK9ewA/Bringing-Solar toScale.pdf
(suggesting a "dedicated fund" for incentivizing solar power installation, which could
reduce break-even time for residential "retrofitted" systems to ten years).
[Vol. 31:113
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does not shine, intermittent resources require either reliable back-up
service from the conventional utility grid, which can be costly,32 or
practical energy storage.3" These costs can be prohibitive and work as
disincentives to the deployment of otherwise cost-effective renewable
resources on-site at corporate locations.
However, on-site cogeneration and self-generation is cost-effective
for many corporations in a variety of locations. The remainder of this
article focuses on on-site self-generation or cogeneration, which can be,
but does not need to be, powered by renewable energy applications.
While there are still subtle, as well as transparent, regulatory system
disincentives to individual corporate use of renewable and self-genera-
tion resources,34 many states provide counterbalancing incentives for
deployment of these technologies.3"
Electricity has only been harnessed in approximately the last
century and a quarter, or roughly the last 2/1000 of one percent of
human history.36 Despite its status as a relatively recent energy form, it
has emerged as the premium carrier form of energy and has no substi-
tute for use in the internet, telecommunications, computing, or informa-
tion technology. These and other machine and appliance applications
require electric voltage, as opposed to the heat produced by combusting
oil, gas or other fossil fuels, as their motive force. 37 Electricity is also
critical because it is not storable in large-scale economic forms, except for
in certain hydroelectric pumped-storage technologies and expensive bat-
tery storage technologies.38
It is critical to note that there is enough space on rooftops in the
U.S. to supply all of the country's electric power needs through existing
photovoltaic solar technology.39 Similarly, roads in the U.S. have enough
surface area to supply that same amount of energy through photovoltaic
technologies. 40 This is not to suggest that we should convert roads, al-
32 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 4:31 (discussing utility back-
up rates).
3 See id. § 2:20 (discussing energy storage).
34See discussion infra Part V.
s5See discussion infra Part IV.
36See generally FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 21, at 260.37 See ENERGYINFO. ADMIN., U.S. HOUSEHOLD ELECTRIcITYREPORT(2005), httpJ/www.eia
.doe.gov/emeu/reps/enduse/erOlus.html (noting the increase in electricity's share ofresi-
dential energy consumption in recent years).
3 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 2:20.39 Id. § 2:11, at 2-26.
4 Id. § 2:11, at 2-24.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
though perhaps we should convert many building roofs, but merely to
indicate that the land area necessary to use existing technologies to
convert relatively diffuse photovoltaic energy sources is not prohibitive
in its quantity. Furthermore, in addition to considering many renewable
energy applications, corporations have options today with conventional
fossil-fuel-fired cogeneration applications.
II. EFFICIENCY AND COGENERATION TECHNOLOGY CHOICES
FOR BusINEss
Technologies that leave the electricity grid, such as qualifying
electric power production facilities ("QFs"), produce power more effi-
ciently than either conventional electricity generation technologies and
industrial process heat applications.4 Conventional electricity generating
technologies generally operate at only about thirty percent efficiency.42
Conventional methods operate so inefficiently because they typically
exhaust as much as two-thirds of the heat energy produced to power
electric generators.43 Conventional technologies use process steam most
often in applications below 400 degrees Fahrenheit, but the combustion
of fossil fuels to produce the steam results in temperatures of more than
3000 degrees Fahrenheit." The unused heat is wasted.45
Cogeneration technologies use the otherwise wasted heat from the
combustion process to make electricity and a second form of useful
energy, usually heat.46 Therefore, these technologies produce two forms
41 FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 21, at 3-4, 7.
42 Id. at 3.
See generally BARRY COMMONER, THE POVERTY OF POWER: ENERGY AND THE ECONOMIC
CRISIS (1976); ENERGY FUTURE (Robert Stobaugh & Daniel Yergin eds., 1979); AMORYB.
LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS (1977); FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 24, at 3.
4FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 2-6.
45 CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, COGENERATION HANDBOOK 1-1 (1982) [hereinafter COGENERATION
HANDBOOK]. Typically, the design of a total energy system takes into account the usable
quantity of heat, the electricity demand, and the output characteristics of various
technologies in order to produce an appropriate split of thermal and electric energy.
Cogeneration technologies, unlike conventional technologies, capture waste heat and
harness it for additional purposes. Id. By harnessing and using what is usually lost as
waste heat, cogenerations technologies realize a "cascading" effect and a double value use
of the energy they produce. Id. This increases overall system efficiency and is
cogeneration's principal advantage over conventional electricity generating technologies.
Id. at 1-1 to 1-3.
4FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 2-6.4.
118 [Vol. 31:113
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of useful energy for the effort and price of one.47 Producing two forms of
usable energy allows cogeneration facilities operate at overall thermal
efficiencies as great as 250-300 percent higher than conventional electric
generating technologies.4" The best cogeneration technologies "are more
than twice as efficient as new coal-fired power plants."49
As conventional generating technologies become more efficient,
they reduce the residual wasted heat energy. 0 Correspondingly, more of
the fuel input is converted to electricity than thermal energy. This in
turn diminishes the efficiency difference between cogeneration and
conventional technologies. The overall efficiency gain is positive,
however, because electricity is a much more valuable and refined energy
product than heat.
Cogeneration technologies raise efficiency under the first and
second laws of thermodynamics."' The efficiency rating for electricity
production under the first law increases to as high as ninety percent with
cogeneration technologies from about thirty-three percent for conven-
tional generating technologies." Cogeneration technologies can achieve
as much as forty-nine percent efficiency under the second law, compared
with thirty-five percent efficiency for conventional technologies.53 The
4 7 id.
48 COGENERATION HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 1-3.
49 Barney L. Capehart & Lynne C. Capehart, Efficiency in Industrial Cogeneration: The
Regulatory Role, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Mar. 15, 1990, at 17, 17-18 (noting that new
coal-fired, central-station power plants have a heat rate of 10,500 British thermal units
per kilowatt-hour ("Btu/kWh"), while the best cogeneration units have a heat rate of only
4500 Btu/kWh).5 0 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 2-6.4.
51 MARC H. Ross & ROBERT H. WILLIAMS, OUR ENERGY: REGAINING CONTROL: A STRATEGY
FOR ECONOMIC REvIVAL THROUGH REDESIGN IN ENERGY USE 156 (1981). The first and
second laws of thermodynamics govern the efficiency of a heat engine, a device that
converts chemical energy to mechanical or electric energy. The first law of
thermodynamics compares the amount of energy created to the amount originally
available in chemical form. The second law of thermodynamics governs the maximum
amount of energy that a system can produce. See generally id.52 Id. at 160.
" See id. at 156. The second law of thermodynamics reflects the quality of energy a
system produces. Electric energy is a much higher quality form of energy than thermal
energy. The Carnot efficiency expresses the ratio of the useful (electric and heat) output
of an engine to the total energy input. In essence, the Carnot efficiency predicts the
maximum potential usable energy output different engine technologies will generate,
without accounting for losses resulting from engine friction, heat loss, and heat
exchanger limitations. The second law of thermodynamics and the Carnot efficiency
provide a means to rate potential efficiencies of different technologies. See NASA,
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increase in operating efficiency reduces the amount of fuel needed to
generate a unit of usable energy; compared to conventional electricity
generation technologies, cogeneration technologies save up to thirty-one
percent on fuel.54
A total cogenerating energy system captures unused heat that can
then be used for direct application heat, industrial process heat, or pre-
heating the combustion air for a utility boiler.55 Capturing and using
waste heat in the process of electric generation achieves greater
efficiency56 by producing more useful energy while generating a lower
amount of environmental pollutants and emissions.57 Locating dispersed
cogeneration systems close to load centers would require less transmis-
sion capability.5" If cogeneration systems are close to load centers, some
areas will no longer need additional transmission capacity, and further-
more, the load on existing transmission grids will be lessened.59 Viewed
another way, if natural gas cogeneration systems replace centrally
dispatched electricity, energy will be moved more in its primary form,
natural gas, and less in its derived form, electricity.6 °
A self-generation provider brings fuel to the user rather than
moving electricity to the user.6 This benefits the continental United States
because it already has a well-developed underground gas distribution
Thermodynamics, http://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/thermo.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2006); see also Robert H. Williams, Industrial Cogeneration, 3 ANN. REV. OF
ENERGY 313, 318- 22 (1978).
5 See FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that cogenerators require
eighty percent of the fuel that conventional generators need to produce the same amount
of energy. Conventional fossil fuel technologies achieve efficiencies ranging from thirty-
three percent for steam cycle to fifty-five percent for combined cycle).
55 FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 2-6.5. Many of these
technologies are derived from the aircraft turbine industry. Id. at 2-6.5, n.5.56 See id. § 10:144, 10-353 to -357. Smaller facilities located on or near the site of consump-
tion reduce the need for transmission facilities, and transmission losses and transmission-
related outage problems are minimized. Id. at 10-353 to -356. Efficient gas turbine
technology that operates below 50 MW can be placed near population centers. See id. at 10-
356 to -357. Depending upon land-use, siting, emissions, and engineering factors involved,
units up to 100 MW may be appropriately located near population centers. See generally id.57 Id. § 2.2, at 2-6.5.
58 See id. § 10:144, at 10-353 to -356.59 Id.
60 Id. § 2.2, at 2-6.5.
"' See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROSPECTS FOR DISTRIBUTED ELECTRICITY
GENERATION, at ix (2003) [hereinafter CBO, PROSPECTS].
120
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system,62 but its electricity transmission corridors are constrained at
points.63 Gas fuel brought to the electricity user in lieu of electricity
would reduce the strain on the electric transmission grid64 and compete
directly with the delivery of centralized electric power along the grid.6"
Switching to gas offers an alternative corridor that efficiently and
effectively delivers power to end users.66
In 2003, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that
producing power at or near customers' homes and businesses (distributed
generation), could improve the reliability of the power supply, reduce the
cost of electricity, and lower emissions of air pollutants.67 Back-up
generation is widespread in hospitals, hotels, commercial office buildings,
malls, a variety of businesses, and even some residences.68 One-fourth of
commercial floor space in the country has some capacity to generate
electricity on-site.69 A program in New York revealed that participating
telecommunications data centers, hotels, universities, banks and news
organizations boasted sixty to one hundred percent more distributed
capacity than their on-site demand.7 °
The United States Department of Energy estimates that distrib-
uted generation will account for more than eleven percent of future
installed generating capacity.7 ' Some estimates are that there are approx-
imately 60,000 MW of installed distributed generation in North America
as of 2004.72 This would represent approximately eight percent of
installed centrally-dispatched generating capacity.73 A distributed energy
system that includes increased use of cogeneration reduces the threat of
disruption, whether from terrorism, weather, or other factors, that faces
62 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U. S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ADDITIONS TO CAPACITY ON THE U.S.
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE NETWORK: 2005, at 1-7 (2006), available at http://wwweia.doe
.gov/pub/oil-gas/natural-gas/feature-articles/2006/ngpipeline/ngpipeline.pdf.63 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 8:2.
64 CBO, PROSPECTS, supra note 61, at xii.65 Id. at 16.
66 See id. at 16.
67 Id. at ix.
68 See id. at 6.
69 Id. (citing ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2003, at tbl.A9 (2003)).70 N.Y. ST. ENERGY RES. & DEV. AUTH., DISTRIBUTED ENERGY & ELECTRIC RELIABILITY-
FACT SHEET (2003).
71 CBO, PROSPECTS, supra note 61, at 7.
72 Rapid Growth Predicted for Distributed Generation, If Cost, Other Hurdles Overcome,
PLATTS ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 17, 2004, at 26, 27.
73 CBO, PROSPECTS, supra note 61, at 3.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLy REV.
centralized generation and distribution systems.74 The value of a distrib-
uted, on-site, cogeneration-based system, likely fueled by natural gas,
results from: reliance on a larger number of small generators, no one of
which is critical to supply very large amounts of energy;7" less reliance
on a vulnerable centralized transmission and distribution grid;" and
reliance on the movement of natural gas fuel in the more protected
underground pipeline system to the electric generation located and
distributed near the demand load center, rather than reliance on more
vulnerable above-ground electric transmission infrastructure to
distribute electric power to the load.77 Gas can be stored in pipelines
while electricity cannot be stored in transmission lines, especially where
they are knocked out." A distribution system with a large number of
small units has greater collective reliability than one with a small
number of large units.7 ' The system has a greater collective reliability
because distributed resources tend to fail less than centralized plants
and are faster to fix.8o In a comparison study, ten industrial independent
power facilities were more reliable than five comparably sized and
constructed utility facilities.8' The ten independent power facilities had
a mean value of availability of 95.6 percent.82 The five utility facilities,
ranging in size from 75 to 500 MW, scored worse with an 86.6 percent
mean value of availability. 3 This limited study indicates that the private
facilities are as reliable or more so than conventional utility facilities.
" Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 261, 272-78 (2005)
[hereinafter Ferrey, Power Future]. See also AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., SMALL IS
PROFITABLE: THE HIDDEN ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF MAKING ELECTRICAL RESOURCES THE
RIGHT SIZE 180-83 (2002); Hisham Zerriffi et al., Electricity and Conflict: Advantages of
a Distributed System, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 55, 57-58.
" Zerriffi et al., supra note 74, at 57.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 57-58.
71 See id. at 58. A conventional system is up to five times more sensitive to loss of load
from various sources than a distributed system. Id. at 63. This analysis concerns losses
of generating capacity, and not losses of transmission or distribution. Id. It also does not
examine the stability of the natural gas supply system. Id. at 62-63.
79 LOVINS ET AL., supra note 74, at 181. They also reduce the reactive power flows by
avoiding transformers. Id. at 225.
8 0 Id. at 186.
81 FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 3:99, at 3-174.
2 See Morton J. Smith, Reliability and Maintainability of Utility and Industrial Cogene-
ration Power Plants, 27 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS 669 (1991).
3 Id.
122 [Vol. 31:113
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The federal government estimates that microturbines generating
power only, as well as small wind turbines, can generate power at a
lifecycle cost of approximately 1 1¢/kWh.8 4 Conversely, cogenerating
microturbines, internal combustion engines producing power only or
cogenerating power, fuel cells, and simple-cycle combustion turbines
generating power only or cogenerating, can each produce power at a life-
cycle cost of less than 10¢/kWh. At these prices, these distributed energy
technologies are competitive with the cost of power delivered to users in
many of the higher cost areas of the country.86 With cogeneration
applications, these technologies are equivalent to the average all-in
system cost of utility grid-delivered power in the United States. 7
As described below, this is so even though the capital costs of
distributed generation per kilowatt are approximately twice the cost of
central station electric generation capacity. 8 Small distributed genera-
tors may also pay fuel prices fifty to seventy percent higher than the bulk
fuel prices paid by central generators.89 Certain subsidies for renewable
distributed power in several of the states,9" as well as state net metering
incentives in forty of the states,9' significantly improve the economics of
on-site distributed energy technologies.
A centralized power generator produces energy at a cost of
approximately 4.5c/kWh, which is lower than the cost of producing
energy from a distributed generator.92 Distributed generation, however,
avoids the additional costs attendant to centralized energy, such as the
84 CBO, PROSPECTS, supra note 61, at 12.
85 Id. The simultaneous co-production and use of thermal energy as well as electric energy
significantly reduces the life-cycle operating cost and improves the economics of
distributed generation. See id. at 10-14.86 Id. at 12-14.
87 Id. at 12.
' Henry Lee, Assessing the Challenges Confronting Distributive Electric Generation,
ELECTRICITY J., June 2003, at 20, 22.89 Id. at 23.
0 See generally Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States'
Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 507 (2004) (discussing the incentives of renewable portfolio
standards and system benefit charge trust funds in the states).
91 See infra Part IV.C. See generally Steven Ferrey, Nothing But Net: Renewable Energy
and the Environment, MidAmerican Legal Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 1 (2003) (discussing regulation of net metering).
92 CBO, PROSPECTS, supra note 61, at 21.
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expense of transmission and distribution 3 to the consumer, stranded
costs,9 4 and any add-on regulatory costs or taxes.
95
III. RELIABILITY OF TRADITIONAL POWER FOR BUSINESSES
The aftermath of the September 11 attacks has increased the
level of scrutiny on the security of the United States' centralized electric
supply and distribution system.9" While experts worry about the security
of large nuclear and fossil-fuel-fired power plants,97 they view on-site
distributed energy sources as more secure, more predictable, and more
reliable than for the conventional fossil fuel counterparts.9" While
centralized generators shut down and trip off during system emergen-
cies, most distributed generation resources remain fully operational.99
A typical electric customer experiences 2.5 hours of outage an-
nually, with more than 80% of these failures attributable to distribution
" Id. at 12, 16. On average, transmission and distribution costs add 25-50% to the
delivered cost of power. Id. at 11. The average cost of transmission and distribution is
deemed to be 2.4c/kWh, adding approximately 30% to the average delivered price of
electricity, which is 7.2c/kWh. Id. at 12.
94 FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 10:42.
95 Id. at § 10:144, at 10-349 to -354.
96 LOVINS ET AL., supra note 74, at 294.9 7 Id.
98See id. at 295-96.
[Filuctuations in renewable energy flows are in this sense better
understood and more predictable than those in the supply of
conventional fuels and power. The methods used to forecast the path of
the sun, or even next week's weather, are considerably more reliable
than those which predict reactor accidents or Saudi politics.
Id. at 269.
Thus renewable sources eliminate at a stroke two of the most fragile
parts of today's energy system-the special localities (foremost among
them the Persian Gulf) where rich deposits of fuel occur in the earth's
crust; and the far flung links which carry raw fuels and deliver
processed energy in copious but concentrated flows over long distances.
In place of these power transportation systems, renewable sources rely
on the automatic arrival of the natural energy flows, direct and
indirect, which are distributed freely, equitably, and daily over the
entire surface of the earth. This energy flow is not subject to
embargoes, strikes, wars, sabotage, or other interferences, nor to
depletion, scarcity, and exhaustion.
Id. at 268.
" See id. at 296.
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system faults. °° Outages and other significant power fluctuations cost
the United States nearly $30 billion a year in 1999 in lost production,
according to the U.S. Department of Energy.' 1 A shortage of electricity
has dire social and political consequences; a blackout has been equated
to a natural disaster. 102
Allowing rolling blackouts as a matter of policy, as occurred in
California and ultimately led to the recall of Governor Davis and the
election of Governor Schwarzenegger,l °3 is a tremendously inefficient way
to balance supply and demand differences.0 During the 2001 rolling
California blackouts, Silicon Valley businesses lost approximately $75
million a day.0 5 The state economy lost $2.3 billion due to production
cutbacks and lost wages during the rolling brownout in the first two
weeks of January 2001.106 The outages reduced gross state output by
$21.8 billion and reduced household income by $4.6 billion more. 0 7
The August 2003 blackout "cost the economy as much as $6
billion."' New York City Comptroller Bill Thompson estimated the
twenty-nine hour August 2003 blackout "cost the city more than $1 billion
in perishable goods and business-a $35 million-per-hour hit."109 In
addition to the comptroller's figure, the New York City Council estimated
' Id. at 191.
'0' See KRiSTINA HAMACHI LACOMMARE & JOSEPH H. ETO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L
LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REP. No. LBNL-55718, UNDERSTANDING THE COST OF POWER
INTERRUPTIONS TO U.S. ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS (2004).
102 Allen W. Williams, Jr., The U.S. Electricity Sector: What After California?,
ELECTRICITY J., June 2001, at 51, 55.
103 Thom Patterson, Genesis of Recall Rooted in California Energy Crisis (Oct. 7, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/06/energy.crisis/.
l04 See id. at 51-53.
O5 Ann Deering, The Expanding Energy Crisis, RISK MGMT., May 1, 2001, at 10, 13-14.
106 id.
107 AUS CONSULTANTS, IMPACT OF A CONTINUING ELECTRICITY CRISIS ON THE CALIFORNIA
ECONOMY, at ii-iv (2001), available at http://www.caltax.org/member/taxletter/reference/
AUSstudyfinal.pdf. See also Study: Summer Blackouts Could Cost the State's Economy
$21.8 Billion; 135,000 Jobs, CAL-TAx DIG., June 2001, http://www.caltax.org/Digestl
2001.06/06.2001.EnergyCrisis.02.htm (summarizing the study reported in IMPACT OF A
CONTINUING ELECTRICITY CRISIS, supra).
'
0 Lorraine Mirabella & Dan Thenh Dang, Utilities Add Blackout to Woes, BALT. SUN,
Aug. 24, 2003, at 10. See also Blackout to Cost Insurers $75 Million, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14,
2003, at 3. The Brattle Group estimated that the August 2003 blackout cost businesses
$6 billion. Id. Given that less than ten percent of U.S. businesses have blackout
insurance, businesses only recouped about $75 million of their losses. Id.
109 Eric Herman et al., New Yorkers Return to Work as Officials Assess Cost to Blackout,
Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, Aug. 18, 2003.
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$40 million in lost tax revenue,11 ° and Mayor Bloomberg estimated $10
million in overtime pay for city workers, including extra police officers on
patrol and sanitation crews that worked through the weekend to pick up
spoiled food."1 "The blackout cost the city's 22,000 eateries alone
between $75 million to $100 million in wasted food and lost business,"
according to the New York State Restaurant Association.'12
The cost of the 2003 blackout in Ohio alone was estimated at $1.1
billion by the Ohio Manufacturers Association.1 3 Within seventy-two
hours of the 2003 blackout, one New York-based law firm filed a class
action suit against the Ohio utility, FirstEnergy, on behalf of all persons
and corporations in the United States that lost energy.14 The blackout
cost Michigan about $1 billion, according to Governor Granholm, 115 where
"[m]ore than 70 manufacturing companies shut down, and state and local
authorities spent about $20 million on emergency services .... "1 1 6 "The
blackout also shut down water and sewage systems in Ohio, creating
1117public health hazards for millions of people ....
Blackouts, like the one which occurred August 14, 2003, are not
necessarily prevented by upgrading either of the primary generation or
transmission sides of the power business."1 In a major cascading
blackout, additional generation would not have been sufficient to prevent
the problem.'19 There were more than 250 then-operating generating
units that tripped off to preserve the integrity of their generating
110 CNN.com, Power Returns to Most Areas Hit by Blackout (Aug. 15, 2003), http://www
.cnn.comI2003fUS/08/15/power.outage.
1' Forbes.com, New York City Economy Loses $1 bln from Blackout (Aug. 18, 2003),
http://www.forbes.com/home-europe/newswire/2003/08/18/rtr1060409.html.
112 Sara Kugler, NYC Calculates Blackout Losses May Have Topped $1 Billion, Associated
Press, Aug. 18,2003, available at httpJ/w4.stern.nyu.edu/news/news/2003/august/0818ap.html.
113 Mark Niquette, Blackout Cost to Ohio Factories Tops $1 Billion, COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Ohio), Sept. 5, 2003.
114 See generally Wolf Halderstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, First Energy Corporation,
http'//www.whaflh.com/modules/caseindey-php?action=view&id=220 (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
115 Brian Charlton, Leaders Ask for Energy Bill, THE STATE NEWS, Sept. 4, 2003,
http://www.statenews.com/article.phtml?pk=18807 (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
11' Sumana Chatterjee, Government Investigating Sharp Rise in Gas Prices, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Sept. 4, 2003, at 1A.
117 Id.
118 See FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 8.2.
119 David White et al., The 2003 Blackout Solution that Won't Cost a Fortune,
ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 2003, at 43, 46-47.
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equipment when lines went down. 2 ° While reserve margins were ade-
quate, the integrated grid as a whole was vulnerable.' 2 '
Upgrades in the transmission system do not necessarily prevent
vulnerability during routine operation, terrorist events, or deliberate
sabotage.'22 Currently, there are almost 30,000 circuit miles of high-
voltage transmission lines (rated at 230 kV and above) in the northeast
United States.'23 It is unclear precisely how to control against loss of
transmission facilities. Whenever a transmission fault occurs, high-
voltage breakers controlled by electronic sensors isolate the fault area to
protect other facilities.'24 These high-voltage transmission facilities are
not needed if there is distributed generation built close to the locus of
power consumption, eliminating the dependent role of high-voltage
transmission between generation and load.'25
A power outage, even a short one, can have an expensive
impact. 126 Brief power interruptions to businesses that rely on refrigera-
tion or digital services can cause losses in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars, or even millions if the outage affects pharmaceutical, brokerage
and semi-conductor companies.'27 A one-hour blackout can cause millions
of dollars in lost production, lost orders, or lost information.' The U.S.
Department of Energy reports costs for power outages for
communication-dependent businesses as: cellular communications,
$41,000/h; telephone ticket sales, $72,000/h; airline reservations,
120 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, IS OUR POWER GRID MORE RELIABLE ONE YEAR AFTER THE
BLACKOUT? (2004), available at http://www.eere.energy.gov/state-energy-program
featuredetailinfo.cfm/fid=32.
121 Id.
122 See White et al., supra note 119, at 46-48. See also North American Electricity
Reliability Council, http://www.nerc.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
123 White et al., supra note 119, at 46.
124 Id. at 47.
125 See id. at 48.
121 JOEL N. SWISHER, CLEANER ENERGY, GREENER PROFITS: FUEL CELLS AS COST-
EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 21 (2002).
127 Id. at 22.
128 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 7
(2000). This study estimates that the value of a one-hour blackout to a brokerage firm is
$6.5 million. Id. At this cost, the reliability value of distributed generation more than
justifies its capital cost. This is because that level of reliability cannot be obtained at any
price from the centralized utility grid. There are no substitutes for this. Therefore, the
proper trade-off is the loss from disruption and this value should be added to the cost of
not having distributed generation.
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$90,000/h; credit card operations, $2.58 million/h; and brokerage
operations, $6.48 millionh.129
IV. STATE INCENTIVES FOR COMPANIES TO ADOPT RENEWABLE OR
DISTRIBUTED TECHNOLOGIES
A. The System Benefit Charge and Trust Fund
The system benefits charge is a tax or surcharge mechanism for
collecting funds from electric consumers, which can then support a range
of activities. 3 ° In order to support demand-side management or renew-
able resources, funds are collected through a non-bypassable system
benefits charge to users of electric distribution services."' The money
raised from the system benefits charge is then used to "buy down" the
cost of power produced from sustainable technologies, so that they can
compete with more conventional technologies." 2 The overall design of the
system is to allow electric utilities to recover certain costs from all retail
electricity customers."'
Fourteen states have established renewable energy subsidy
programs funded by system benefit charges that, between 1998 and 2012,
should raise approximately $3.4 billion.14 Approximately half of the
amount collected-at least $135 million per year--comes just from
"
9 R. COWART ET AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, NRELSR-560-32498,
STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATORY POLICY AND DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES: DISTRIBUTED
RESOURCES AND ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY 10 (2002), available at http://www.nrel
.gov/docs/fy03osti/32498.pdf (quoting NAT. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE PROGRAM AND STRATEGIC PLAN (2000)).
13o These activities could include energy efficiency programs, renewable energy projects,
and low income customer assistance. The activities supported might range from research
and development to pilot projects to the implementation of mature technologies. TELLUS
INSTITUTE & STEVEN FERREY, SUSTAINABLE ELECTRICITY FOR NEW ENGLAND: DEVELOPING
REGULATORY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL TOOLS TO PROMOTE AND SUPPORT
ENVIRONMENTALLY-SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRIC INDUSTRY
RESTRUCTURING 33 (1996).
"' Mark Bolinger et al., States Emerge As Clean Energy Investors: A Review Of State
Support For Renewable Energy, ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 2001, at 82, 82.132 Id. at 82-83.
133 id.
1 Id. at 83 (noting that those 14 states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin).
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California.'35 The funding levels range from $0.07/MWh in Wisconsin, up
to almost $0.6/MWh in Massachusetts. 136 The funds are disbursed as
either investments, grants, other subsidies, or research and development
grants by the funding agency. 3 v Most only provide assistance to new
projects and not existing renewable projects. 3
"Normalizing all incentives to their 5-year production incentive
equivalent" (using a 10% discount rate), states have subsidized large-
scale renewable energy projects in a range of 0.1-7c/kWh.'39 "Wind power
has been a major beneficiary of these subsidies." 4 ° The subsidy level in
California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island ranges from 0.59-
1.95c/kWh for wind and hydroelectric projects, and from 0.11-0.57€/kWh
for landfill gas projects.' Table 1 shows state adoption. 142
B. Renewable Resource Portfolio Requirements
Portfolio standards will more efficiently promote the renewable
power industry than renewable trust funds." Portfolio standards require
that certain electricity sellers and buyers maintain a percentage of
designated, clean resources in their wholesale supply mix.' 1 Market
participants must satisfy portfolio standards as efficiently as possible. 45
Trust funds are contractually obligated to create a discretionary gift
program.'46 Portfolio standards require participants to take initiative and
operate efficiently; renewable projects take as little action as possible
while still conforming themselves to funding criteria. 147 Political
manipulation of trust fund cash flows also is possible, and withdrawing
135 Id. (noting that "Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey are the next largest
funds, each collecting on average between $20 and $30 million per year.").136 Id. at 83.
137 See id. at 85.
13 8 Id.
139 
MARK BOLINGER ET AL., CLEAN ENERGY FUNDS: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE SUPPORT FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY, at ix (2001), available at http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/
servlets/purl/783499-FqqXYE/native/783499.pdf.
'40 Bolinger et al., supra note 131, at 86.
141 BOLINGER ET AL., supra note 139, at 26.
142 See infra tbl.1.
143 See Ferrey, Power Future, supra note 74, at 285-86.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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trust funds for general budget purposes has occurred already in Mas-
sachusetts and elsewhere.'
Portfolio standards are flexible so that market competition and
innovation guide conformity.'49 Certain technologies can be included in
the renewables definition, or certain subgroups of technologies can be
targeted for inclusion at distinct levels.' 50 Conditioning retail sale
licensure on conformity makes the standards self-enforcing.' 5 ' Excess
credits are fungible; noncompliant retailers can purchase surplus credits
at a market rate from those who overachieve the standard. 52 Resource
portfolio requirements do not place either wholesale or retail competitors
at a disadvantage.'53
Some aspects of the renewable portfolio standards programs
mirror provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, which the United States has
notably declined to ratify."M The Protocol's Clean Development Mecha-
nism ("CDM") allows projects that reduce greenhouses gases in develop-
ing nations to earn Certified Emission Reductions ("CER") for each ton
ofC0 2-equivalent of GHG reduced.'55 Those CERs are then traded or sold
to activities in Annex I developed countries which increases that
country's emission cap allocated in the Protocol.5 6
A second mechanism for compliance is Joint Implementation
("JI") where developed nation signatory parties can implement projects
148 Id..
149 id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at http://unfccc.intl
resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 at the third
session of the Conference of the Parties ("COP3") to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC") in Kyoto, Japan. For six greenhouse gases
("GHG") that are suspected of causing global warming, principally including carbon
dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4 ), major developed countries (called the Annex I parties)
have targets for reduction of these GHGs in the period 2008-2012. One hundred sixty-two
countries ratified the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol received subsequent national adoption
by fifty-five percent of Annex I party signatories, notably excluding the U.S., by February
2005 and then entered into effect. Most countries have committed to achieving an eight
percent reduction in CO2 below 1990 levels, although the European Union measures their
reduction as a weighted overall average for all the European Union countries.
155 Id. art. 12.
156 Id. art. 12, para. 3(b).
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in their or other Annex I nations that remove GHGs or create additional
carbon sinks, which then is quantified in an Emission Reduction Unit
("ERU").157 An ERU transfers a unit of allowed carbon emissions from a
selling country's cap to the purchasing country.'58 Unlike a CDM CER,
which creates an additional emission unit added to the cap, a JI project
transfers a credit under the existing cap from one nation to another
nation.'59 Thus, the emission cap of any country includes assigned Kyoto
credit units plus removal units ("RMU") from forestation projects that
remove CO 2 from the atmosphere, plus JI ERUs and CDM CERs. 16 °
Carbon reduction projects are suggested and implemented by a
variety of private entrepreneurs who try to create CERs at less capital
cost than the revenue stream they generate. For-profit entities have
become project proponents and traders in this new market. Once a
project passes Executive Board review, it becomes a prototype for
subsequent and similar projects.' 6 ' CERs are only created for projects
that reduce GHGs in excess of the business-as-usual baseline emissions
of one of the six regulated GHGs. The manner by which a methodology
estimated baseline carbon emissions is critical to its approval. Especially
in developing nations, the baseline of existing carbon emissions is subject
to some discretionary interpretation. The verification stage of the CDM
process is meant to try to adjust the crediting mechanism with the
carbon reduction reality of the given project. While monitoring is
required, it can vary.
As states deregulate their retail electric sectors, they have
implemented renewable portfolio ("RP") standards and/or trust funds. 6 2
Twelve states have elected RP standards. 6 ' Each defines an eligible
renewable resource differently. The diverse pattern of "renewable"
resources included under state definitions is set forth in Table 2.1'
157 Id. art. 3, para. 10-12.
158Id.
159 Id.
13 Id. at art. 12. CDM projects have to be approved by the designated national authority
in the developing nation where the project is sited, validation by an independent entity
chartered under the Protocol, registered and approved after review by the Executive Board
of the CDM, and later verified and certified when emission reductions are achieved.
161 Id. art. 12.
162 Id.
163 See infra tbl. 1.
'64 See infra tbl.2.
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C. State Net Metering
Where the electric consumer generates its own electricity on-site,
the concept of net metering..5 may be applicable. Net metering, or net
billing, is the cornerstone of state energy policy to encourage private
investment in distributed generation resources."' Under net billing, the
customer who utilizes an alternate (typically renewable) energy pro-
duction system connects with the utility grid employing a bi-directional
single meter.'67
Under a state's net metering policy, electric utility meters are
designed and allowed by law to spin either forward or backward.'68 The
direction of rotation depends upon who supplies the electricity at a certain
instant as reflected in the net electricity flow.'69 For example, if a
generator of exportable electricity also owns and operates a solar photo-
voltaic panel, the meter would run backwards, signifying an export of
power to the electric utility provider during daylight hours when the solar
panels were providing the customer-generator with excess electricity. 7 °
This surplus electricity would enter the grid with the electricity generated
by the utility and enable the utility to sell it to another consumer along
the transmission line.' 7 ' Conversely, the solar photovoltaic panel would
not generate power at night and the customer would purchase electricity
from the generating utility, thus causing the meter to rotate forward in
the conventional direction reflecting a sale to the customer.'72
The process of net metering balances and nets the electricity flows
at the end of the billing period. A net gain of electricity sold to the
165 Although the term "net metering" is generally used to refer to this process, states vary
in their descriptions of this concept, using such phrases as "net metering," "net billing,"
"net energy metering," "net energy billing," "parallel billing," "reverse direction
metering," and "distributed generation." In this paper the phrase "net metering" will
refer to all of the different terms for the same concept.
16 See Ferrey, Power Future, supra note 74, at 286.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. States that have adopted net metering policies lay out the definition of net
metering in statutes and regulations. For example, New Hampshire's public utilities
statute defines net metering as follows: "net energy metering' means measuring the
difference between the electricity supplied over the electric distribution system and the
electricity generated by an eligible customer-generator which is fed back into the electric
distribution system over a billing period." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-A: 1-a(III-a) (2006).
171 See Ferrey, Power Future, supra note 74, at 286.
171 See FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 4:27.
172 Id.
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consumer becomes an amount owed to the utility, and a net loss of
electricity bought by the consumer becomes an amount owed by the
customer. If the customer-generator's electricity production fell below its
consumption, the utility company would bill the customer for the dif-
ference. If the customer-generator produced more electricity than it
required, this excess electricity would be effectively banked for future
credit in a form determined by the state's net metering law.
On March 28, 2001 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC")held that state net metering decisions were not preempted by
Federal law.'73 In its holding, FERC held that "no sale occurs when an
individual homeowner or farmer (or similar entity...) installs [distrib-
uted] generation and accounts for its dealings with the utility through
the practice of netting."174 This surprising decision appeared to contradict
multiple FERC precedents when it upheld the state's jurisdiction over
these types of net metering transactions, removed FERC jurisdiction,
and deemed a change of title to power not to constitute a "sale."'75 FERC
ultimately held that "no sale occurs when an individual installs
[distributed] generation and accounts for its dealings with the utility
through the practice of netting."'76 Thus FERC ignored the physical
reality of the transfer of the electrons.
Forty U.S. states have adopted this relatively simple concept,'
and as a result, each of these states has promulgated its own particular
statutes and regulations.' The development of net metering implemen-
"'See MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 F.E.R.C. 61,340(2001). In March 2001, MidAmerican
Energy Company challenged before FERC the state of Iowa's regulations directing
MidAmerican "to interconnect with three Alternate Energy facilities and to offer net
billing arrangements to those facilities." Id. 61, 340, at 62,261. MidAmerican also
requested a declaratory order that federal law preempted these regulations. Id.
"MidAmerican asked the Commission to undertake enforcement action against the Iowa
Board, or to issue a declaratory order" that the final orders of the Iowa Board are
preempted by PURPA. Id.
174 Id. at 62,263.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See Interstate Renewable Energy Council, "Connecting to the Grid" Project: State and
Utility Net-Metering Rules and Programs, httpJ/www.irecusa.org/connect/netmetering .pdf
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006). The first 30 states to adopt net metering before the MidAmerican
decision were: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.7
' See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Summary Tables: Net
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tation among the states occurred in two phases.'79 The enactment of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act ("PURPA") in the early 1980s spurred
several states to adopt net metering policies. 8 0 More recently, some states
implemented net metering in response to the proliferation of deregula-
tion in the electric utility industry.
181
While Minnesota was the first state to enact net metering, be-
tween 1980 and 2000, three dozen other states adopted some form of net
metering.8 2 They are displayed in Table 3.183 For interpreting this data,
FERC defines avoided costs as "the incremental costs to an electric
utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase
from the qualifying facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would
generate itself or purchase from another source." "'
Electricity cannot be stored efficiently." If not consumed instantly,
it is grounded and lost.8 6 It has no shelf life.'87 Its value fluctuates
dramatically by more than 200 percent across the hours in a typical day. i'8
Therefore, a distribution generator or other seller exchanging power to the
utility after midnight, when that power has its least value and may not
be capable of resale and thus valueless, does not have the same market
value as a distribution generator taking power from a utility at noon
Incentives for Renewable Energy, httpJ/www.dsireusa.orgsunmarytables/regl.cfm (follow
the "Net Metering" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter DSIRE Net Metering
Summary Table]; see also FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 4:25.
179Id.
" See DSIRE Net Metering Summary Table, supra note 178.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See infra tbl. 3.
184 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2006). See Seth M. Colton & James W. Brehl, Cogeneration-
The Small Facility Perspective in Minnesota, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 480-84
(1985). It appeared that the Minnesota statute was clear that a customer-generator was
only entitled to receive the utility's avoided cost for the excess electricity provided. Id. at
484-85. Originally, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission ("MPUC") rules provided
that a QF with a capacity of less than 20 kilowatts would be compensated at the lowest
retail rate and a QF with a capacity of 20-40 kilowatts would be compensated at the
utility's avoided cost. Id. at 485. The MPUC rule that provided for these alternative rates
was subsequently amended to provide for the current rates as described above. Id. at 485-
86. See also MINN. STAT. § 216B.164(3) (2005); MINN. R. 7835.3300 (2006).185 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, § 2:20.
186 See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 501 (3rd ed.2004).
187 id.
'" See, e.g., ISO NEW ENGLAND INC., HOURLY HISTORICAL DATA POST-MARKET: MAY 1999-
FEB 2003, http'//www.iso-ne.com/markets/hstdata/hourly/his-data-post/index.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006) (showing hourly price fluctuations in New England).
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when the marginal cost of power is high. 189 Yet, net metering values each
transaction at the same rate.9 ° In either direction through the retail
meter, the electrons are accounted at the retail sale rate.' 9 '
V. UTILITY DISINCENTIVES TO COUNTER DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
AT BUSINESS SITES
A. Business Power Grid Access
The 2003 Congressional Budget Office evaluation of distributed
generation concluded that hindrances to cost-effective distributed gen-
eration could be diminished without compromising other important social
goals by:
* "Ensur[ing] access to the grid for distributed
generators under uniform technical and contrac-
tual terms and charges for interconnection that are
based on true economic costs.... "'92
* Establishing fair prices for sale of power to the grid
and stand-by service back to distributed generators
"consistent with utilities' wholesale hourly costs to
deliver power to different locations .... 193
* Establishing uniform air emission permitting, land
use and building code requirements that accommo-
date the role of distributed generation. 94
The overlap of state, federal and local authority over environmen-
tal, economic and regulatory matters affecting electric power complicates
'89 See id.
" Green Power Network, Net Metering Policies, http://www.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/
markets/netmetering.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
191 See id.
192 CBO, PROSPECTS, supra note 61, at 29. Several states, such as New York and Texas,
have adopted interconnection standards for smaller distributed generators up to 150 kW.
Id. at 30. FERC is developing "procedures and agreements for interconnection and
parallel operation of [distributed] generators and utility transmission systems."Id. at 30.
See also Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,749 (proposed Aug. 16, 2002).
193 CBO, PROSPECTS, supra note 61, at 29.
194 Id.
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this equation.'95 Grid protection requirements can impose time-consum-
ing and expensive burdens on each individual on-site distributed
generator that remains connected to the grid for parallel operation.196
The National Renewable Energy Laboratory documented several cases
in which utilities insisted on duplicative additional equipment that was
already employed in the packaged distributed generation systems they
used. "'97 The utilities' interconnection requirements often caused aban-
donment of planned distributed energy projects that were competitive to
utility centralized power supply. 9'
When distributed generators use fossil technologies without
cogenerating thermal energy, and thus do not become QFs under
PURPA,"'9 they have no right to sell power back to the utility unless the
state has adopted a net metering or similar requirement. Even when the
state has adopted such a requirement, in many cases the right to resell
power back to the utility is limited to certain renewable distributed
generators of a particular small size.200 Where there is no right for
certain particular distributed generators to sell power back to the utility,
this provides economic disincentives to efficient operation of the
distributed generator to coincide with regional electric system peak
requirements. °1 Distributed generators that do not see pricing that truly
reflects the value of their output to the grid may remain idle when they
could help grid requirements.0 2 Because many state regulatory
commissions disregard distributed power, or at least do not evaluate all
generating assets in an integrated fashion, many of the incentives
provided to regular utilities are counterposed to incentives that would
195 Id.
196 Id. at 23. "[A]dditional site-specific equipment may include voltage regulators, frequency
synchronizers, isolation devices, monitoring devices, and network protection devices." Id.
at 24. While specialized studies for individual operators are often required by utilities, on-
site generators argue for a streamlined standard that would apply to all situations and
eliminate the need to pay for individualized and time-consuming studies. Id.
197 See NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, MAKING CONNECTIONS:
CASE STUDIES OF INTERCONNECTION BARRIERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DISTRIBUTED POWER
PROJECTS 9-10 (2000).
198 See id. at 6.
'99 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2001).
200 See infra tbl. 3.
201 See NATL RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 107, at 37.
202 Id. at 68.
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make the entire system, including distributed generators, operate in an
economically efficient, integrated least-cost manner.2 3
B. Utility Stand-By Power Sales to Businesses
Electric utilities must make necessary "backup,"214 "interrupt-
ible,"" 5 "maintenance, "' °6 or "supplemental"201 power available to QFs.2 °8
Businesses generating their own power with cogeneration, renewables,
or waste products, can qualify as QFs.2 °9 Pursuant to PURPA, such
transactions- must be made nondiscriminatorily and be "just and
reasonable and in the public interest."210 Essentially, any power sale to
a QF that does not reflect sound economic principles must have a cost
basis justification.21'
Under federal law, price rates for backup and standby power must
not be discriminatory towards business QFs that generate their own
power or have third parties generate their power at their facilities.2 2 As
a result of the FERC's holding in Alcon," ' businesses are allowed to
203 Id. at 36.
204 "Back-up power" is defined as "electric energy or capacity supplied by an electric utility
to replace energy ordinarily generated by a facility's own generation equipment during
an unscheduled outage of the facility." 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(9) (2005).
205 "Interruptible power" is "electric energy or capacity supplied by an electric utility [to
a QF] subject to interruption by the electric utility under specified conditions." 18 C.F.R.
§ 292.101(b)(10).
206 "Maintenance power" is "electric energy or capacity supplied by an electric utility
during scheduled outages of the qualifying facility." 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(11).
207 "Supplementary power" is power or "capacity supplied by an electric utility" to a QF
to augment self-generated electricity. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(8).
208 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(b)(1) (2005).
209 See id. §§ 292.201-207.
210 Id. § 292.305(a)(1).
211 Id. § 292.305(a)(2).
212 See id.
213 Alcon, Inc., 32 F.E.R.C. 61,247, 61,576 (1985). The FERC reversed its prior decision
and found upon rehearing that the host customer of a third-party-owned QF power
endeavor was eligible to receive standby power. The relevant parties, two topping cycle
cogeneration facilities with a combined capacity of 1.8 MW, were involved in the lease
agreement. Id. at 61,576. O'Brien, the installer and operator of the cogeneration
equipment, leased the equipment to Alcon, the site owner and consumer of the energy
produced. Id. at 61,576-77. Alcon's argument that it was legally allowed to purchase
backup power directly from the local electric utility was predicated on the assertion that
it owned the equipment. Id. at 61,576. However, if O'Brien, as the owner of the QF
facility, purchased backup power, it was prohibited from reselling or retailing that
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receive backup power from the utility notwithstanding their acquiring
primary power from a private third party.214 In some jurisdictions, these
rates are set and standardized, but in others they must be negotiated
with the utility.21 There are several factors, outlined by FERC, that
utilities may consider when determining standby rates.216
backup power to Alcon because such an action would cause it to be classified as an
electric utility rather than a QF. Id. at 61,579. The FERC did not initially find the
lease/purchase agreement between the parties to be persuasive in demonstrating that
Alcon and O'Brien jointly owned the equipment. Id. at 61,577. In addition, FERC found
that the entire Alcon pharmaceutical facility did not qualify as a cogeneration facility. Id.
at 61,577-78. As a result of the FERC's initial findings, O'Brien and PREPA, O'Brien's
back up power supplier, were prohibited from selling backup power to Alcon. Id. at
61,579. Commissioner Stalon vigorously dissented from this position on the grounds that
the form of corporate ownership selected should not bias the right to backup power for
a QF. Id. at 61,581-87. On rehearing, a wave of protests from QFs, states, and the natural
gas industry, combined with a desire to encourage cogeneration, prompted the FERC to
adopt Stanlon's dissent as the majority position and reverse its decision. Id. at 61,118-20.
Alcon, Inc. (Alcon I/), 38 F.E.R.C. 61,042, 61,118 (1987), petition for review denied sub
nom. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth. V. FERC, 848 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that
a broad reading of which entities may receive the benefits of QFs fulfills congressional
purpose). FERC found that its previous order effectively denied backup power to entities
which consume QF power as a result of their financial and legal structure. Id. at 61,119.
This effect contradicts the legislative history of PURPA, which conveys a purpose of
liberally affording a right to backup power without consideration of ownership and use.
Id. at 61,119-20. Although Alcon did not own the equipment, they consumed the energy
output and contracted for an option to purchase the QF equipment at the end of the lease.
Id. at 61,120. On rehearing, FERC's realigned majority found distinctions in ownership
to be immaterial in this situation because the output of the QF was dedicated to Alcon
for consumption. Id. Although the owner of the QF equipment and consumer of the QF
energy output were distinct, the distinction was compelled by tax and financing
advantages. Id.214 Alcon H, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,120.
215 See id.
211 See Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, Sales of Power to Qualifying
Facilities, and Interconnection Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 9,331, 9,333 (proposed Mar. 22,
1988). These factors are:
(i) The expected timing of forced outages of the qualifying facility, if
there is any reason to expect they would not occur with random
probability;
(ii) The expected frequency of forced outages of the qualifying facility;
(iii) The expected duration of forced outages of the qualifying facility;
(iv) The expected demand placed on the supplying utility's generating
resources in the event of a forced outage of the qualifying facility;
(v) The expected cost of electrical energy associated with the capacity
to be used to meet the demand in the event of a forced outage of the
qualifying facility;
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Utilities employ a variety of methodologies for standby rate
design. The majority use a modification of a general service rate to price
standby service. 217 A smaller number of utilities use complex analyses of
costing and pricing analyses.211 Stand-by service charges can raise a
business's generation costs by up to twenty percent because the charges
can be as high as $18.75/kWh/month.219
By arguing that, to a substantial degree, utility expenses scale
with utility peak demand rather than with annual electricity sales,
utilities are able to set high stand-by rates on distributed cogenerators
needing back-up power.22 ° Therefore, with a decrease in utility sales due
to distributed generation, there is loss of revenue but no decrease in costs
for peak demand services. The stand-by rate charge thus is posited to
make a utility economically whole.
In a static environment this might be true, but with constantly
growing U.S. electricity demand, 22 1 the justification for stand-by rates on
distributed generation is less clear: any new surplus capacity created by
businesses' self-generating power can help support the increasing annual
demand of other consumers. "The ability of a distributed generator to
[reduce] utility capacity is a function . . . of its coincident peak."222
"Typically, the net reduction in utility peak resource utilization [attribut-
able to a distributed generator] is usually only 50 to 90 percent of the
(vi) The costs, if any, associated with transmission and distribution
facilities used to meet the demand resulting from a forced outage of the
qualifying facility; and
(vii) The terms of back-up service in regard to its position as firm or
interruptible service, and the cost such terms of service imposed on the
supplying utility.
Id.217 Seegenerally EDISONELEcrIZ c INST., STANDBYRATEs: METHODSANDDESCRWIONS (1991).
2 18 id.
219 See NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 197 at 22. The study concludes that
variations in stand-by rates "demonstrate a lack of consistency and an absence of
regulatory oversight of [stand-by] tariffs.. ." and "the lack of appropriate regulatory
principles or standards.., creates uncertainty." Id. at 23-24.
220 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, at § 4:33, at4-96 to -101
(providing a description and comparison of utility stand-by rates).
221 See Energy Information Administration, Electricity Supply and Demand Fact Sheet,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/fact-sheets/supply&demand.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006).
22 Sean Casten, Are Standby Rates Ever Justified? The Case Against Electric Utility
Standby Charges as a Response to On-Site Generation, ELECTRICITY J. 58, 60 (2003).
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rated power of the DG unit."223 Conventional regulatory techniques do
not credit a distributed generator with any rate reduction in transmis-
sion and distribution assets of the centralized utility system.224
C. Exit Fees
States regulate the free exit of corporate consumers from the
electric system in drastically different ways.225 On one extreme, states can,
though non currently do, permanently ban the conventional utility retail
service the network.226 In order to curb certain forms of competition in the
retail sector, a state can limit retail wheeling, the transmission of power
across a utility's territory.227 Another option for utilities is to impose "exit"
fees on customers who switch to distributed generation and depart
centralized service.22 State electricity restructuring statutes vary as to
whether they specifically address exit fees or ignore them completely.
229
States also differ in their application of exemptions from exit fees:
some fully exempt corporate self-generators, while others offer only
conditional exemptions. Still other states affirmatively impose exit fees
on self-generating consumers. Six states exempt new self-generation from
all stranded costs or exit fees. Seven states do not exempt self-generation
223 Id. at 60. If distributed generation does not increase at a rate sufficient to fully offset
increases in system electric demand, there are few stranded costs for the system as a whole
attributed to existing distributed generation when existing generation capacity is freed and
made available to serve increasing load in lieu of new centralized generation construction.
Id. at 63. Once implemented, distributed generation is actually an asset cross-subsidizing
the central utility system. Id. at 61-62. Therefore, a holistic look at societal impacts may not
justify stranded costs imbedded in either exit fees or stand-by rates ascribed to distributed
generation, as this may not take account of the benefits distributed generation has on
constrained transmission and distribution investments. Id. at 63.
2.4 Id. at 61. The author calculates that each kW of distributed generation on average
eliminates the need for $1,300 of added construction of assets, primarily in the form of
transmission and distribution assets, but also including substation assets. Id. at 61
(citing ARTHUR D. LITTLE, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE AND
FUEL CELL APPLICATIONS IN BUILDING APPLICATIONS (2000)). Many forms of distributed
generation can be installed for less than $1,300/kW. Id. This savings accrues to all
customers, not just those with distributed generation. Id. Therefore, there is a
transmission and distribution subsidy to non-distributed generation customers by those
who install distributed generation. Id. at 62.225 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, §10:45, 10-139 to -146.
226 Id. at 10-140.
227 See FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 21, at Glossary.
228 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 4, §10:45, at 10-139 to -140.
229 See id. at §10:45.
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and impose exit fees, at least under certain conditions. Massachusetts and
New Jersey conditionally allow self-generation without exit fees.23°
Connecticut imposed exit fees legislatively, only to have its regulatory
agency back away administratively from enforcing such fees.23' Pennsyl-
vania imposes an exit fee only if the self-generation operates in parallel
with the grid.232
1. No Exit Fees
Many states do not impose exit fees on departing cogenerators,
instead adopting the deregulation approach. California, Maine, New
York, and Ohio do not allow exit fees233 and New Hampshire disfavors
exit fees.234 Texas does not impose exit fees on any facility unless it
exceeds 10 MW. 235 Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont neither expressly
impose or prohibit exit fees.236 Thus, nine states allow companies to exit
for self-generation without repercussions.
New Hampshire's disfavor of exit fees is conveyed in its restruc-
turing legislation, which provides that "[e]ntry fees and exit fees are not
preferred recovery mechanisms." 7 Maine's restructuring statute takes
a similar approach and states:
A customer who significantly reduces or eliminates con-
sumption of electricity due to self-generation, conversion to
an alternative fuel or demand-side management may not
be assessed an exit or reentry fee in any form for the
See infra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 840E (2006), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3209(3) (2005),
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Op. No. 96-8, Case No. 95-E-0172 (Mar. 29, 1996), OH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 4928.37 (A)(2)(b) (2006).
23'See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
236 OR. REV. STAT. § 757.607 (2006), R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-1-27 (2006), VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
30, § 8003 (2006).
01 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374-F:3(XII)(d) (2006). The statute further provides that "any
recovery of stranded costs should be through a nonbypassable, nondiscriminatory,
appropriately structured charge that is fair to all customer classes, lawful, constitutional,
limited in duration, consistent with the promotion of fully competitive markets and
consistent with these principles." Id.
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reduction or elimination of consumption or reestablishment
of service with a transmission and distribution utility.
238
Texas and some other states provide for the creation of various
exemptions from the payment of exit fees. Since the 1999 passage of its
deregulation legislation, Texas effectively authorizes an exit fee for new
medium and large self-generation facilities by prohibiting any customer
from utilizing an on-site self-generation system which exceeds 10MW in
order to avoid stranded costs.
239
Unlike Texas, Ohio specifically provides that the stranded cost
transition charge only applies to service delivered over the central
distribution system, and does not impose the charge on self-generated
electricity that is both produced and consumed in Ohio.24° It remains
unclear whether this includes third-party on-site generation because self-
generated electricity is undefined in the Ohio statute.241
2. Exit Fees
Some states, specifically Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Mary-
land, impose some form of an exit fee on newly implemented self-
generation practices. A Connecticut statute applies exit fees to operations
that exit the system in order to use self-generation.242 Although the
Connecticut legislature issued a command to develop an exit fee
structure for new self-generators,243 the Connecticut Department of
Public Utility Control ("DPUC") concluded that imposing exit fees would
limit customer choice and consumer load management as well as
increase costs discriminatorily against new self-generation. 2' The DPUC
recommendations called for the prohibition of exit fees against self-
generators of less than 2 MW or those employing renewable resources.
245
238 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3209(3) (2005).
239 TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.252 (Vernon 2005).
240 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.37(A)(2)(b) (2006).
241 Id. § 4928.01(33).
242 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245w(b) (West 2005).
243 Id. § 16-245w(d) (West 2005).
244 CONN. DEP'T OF PUB. UTIL. CONTROL, DPUC REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON
EXIT FEES 10 (1998).245 Id. at 9. The DPUC predicted that imposing a conservation exit fee on conserving self-
generators, or a renewable trust fund exit fee on renewably powered self-generation,
would have the perverse effect of discouraging the very technologies and measures that
such fees, on their face, are designed to promote. Id.
142 [Vol. 31:113
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In lieu of assessing an exit fee, Pennsylvania considers imposing
a competitive transition cost that should be paid by the customer:
[Ihf a customer installs on-site generation which operates
in parallel with other generation on the public utility's
system and which significantly reduces the customer's
purchases of electricity through the transmission and
distribution network, the customer's fully allocated share
of transition or stranded costs shall be recovered from the
customer through a competitive transition charge.246
Although Pennsylvania appears to impose an exit fee, the statute
only applies to self-generators that operate parallel to the utility.247 On-
site generation which does not utilize the central distribution lines
avoids stranded costs in Pennsylvania. A facility that installs sufficient
redundant power generation and ceases grid connection would therefore
not be assessed exit fees or transition charges.248
3. Limited Exit at Own Risk
Another approach taken by some states is imposition of conditional
exit fees based on the quantity of electricity that results from self-
generation. Massachusetts, for example, promulgated a deregulation
statute which instituted a conditional exit fee.249 Under the Massachu-
setts statute, a customer is exempt from an exit fee if the state regulatory
agency and the utility are given six months notice of its plan to (1) "install
on-site cogeneration equipment, renewable energy technologies, [or] fuel
cells;" or (2) obtain electricity "though the operation of, or [third-party]
purchases from, on-site generation or cogeneration equipment."250 The
exemption is contingent on the installation meeting any one of the
246 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2808(a) (West 2000).
247 Id.
' In some cases, the self-generation equipment does not operate in parallel with that of
the utility. Some consumers may opt to install oil-fired or other generation to provide
backup power on-site and enable them to disconnect from the grid. Some self generators
in the United States have done this, but this configuration is much more common where
a grid-based source is unreliable or subject to frequent decreases in power, such as
certain developing nations. Typically, the economic advantage of more reliable backup
rate structures motivates the establishment of this structure.249 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 1G (West 2003).
250 Id. § 1G(g).
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following criteria: (a) the customer leaves the system and provides 10% or
less of "the annual gross [power] revenues collected by its previous service
provider in the year prior to the customer leaving the system;" 5' (b) "the
customer reduces purchases through the operation of, or purchases from,
onsite renewable energy technologies, fuel cells, or cogeneration equip-
ment with a combined heat and power system efficiency of at least 50 per
cent based upon the higher heating value of the fuel used in the
system;"5 2 or (c) "the customer reduces purchases through the operation
of, or purchases from, an onsite generation or cogeneration facility of 60
kilowatts or less which is eligible for net metering. "253
Effectively, Massachusetts does not hinder exit to on-site
generation for any business for any type of technology if there is a
gradual corporate exodus rather than a stampede. However, certain
small net metered, efficient cogeneration, and renewable technologies are
unconditionally protected from the threat of exit fees. At most, others pay
only an exit fee proportionate to the amount exceeding the 10 percent
cumulative system exodus cushion." Now, almost a decade after
deregulation, no corporate self-generator bears any exit fee charges.25
New Jersey's deregulation legislation. 6 follows the model of the
Massachusetts legislation, where exit fees are not applied to modest
cumulative self-generation as long as it is not greater than 7.5% of prior
251Id. § 1G(g)(i). In the event that two or more customers who represent in the aggregate
at least 10 percent of the annual gross revenues collected by the previous service provider
in the year prior to the initial exit from the system leave the same distribution system
at any time within a rolling thirty-six month backward-looking period, "all such
customers shall be subject to an exit charge based upon that portion of the annual gross
revenues that exceeds the 10% threshold." Id. § 1G(g)(I). Such an exit fee is "prorated
amongst customers who have left... the system based upon the proportion of annual
gross revenues each [departing] customer represented within the total amount of gross
revenues" exiting for self-generation. Id.
252 Id. § 1G(g)(ii).
25 Id. § 1G(g)(iii). "Except as provided in existing contracts or tariffs, the department and
the utility shall not require more than six months notice of the customer's plans to install
said equipment." Id. Massachusetts permits net metering of renewable and cogeneration
customers of all rate classes that self-generate less than 60 kW. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 164, § 1G (West 2003). See also Mass. Dept of Telecomm. & Energy Order 97-11.
254 See id. § 1(G)(g).
25 Mass. Dept of Telecomm. & Energy Order 97-11.
256 Electric Discount and Energy Competition Act, 1999 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 23 (West)
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:3-49 to -98 (West 1998)).
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centralized power sales.257 Self-generation in existence prior to the
statute's passage in 1999 is unconditionally exempt from exit fees.258
Many states have struggled with and resolved the conflict be-
tween the disincentive of exit fees and the promotion of distributed and
renewable energy through free customer exit and entrance. This limited
exit fee structure evidences a policy preference for decentralized and
renewable power, but at the expense of using the rate base to cross-
subsidize these technologies, which will have to support repayment of all
utility stranded costs over fewer customers.
D. Permitting Distributed and Renewable Generation
For many on-site distributed generating facilities, which may
burn fossil fuel or use renewable technology, the siting issue is not so
much the difficulty of obtaining conventional environmental permits, but
the complexities of interfacing smaller units into the utility grid and
obtaining back-up power supplies when necessary.25 9 The permits that
may be required for large generation are illustrated in Table 4.26 Of
particular interest is that most on-site corporate-scale self-generation
facilities avoid almost all of the state and federal approval requirements,
257 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-77 (West 1998). Every customer's bill provides for a
"shopping credit," which enables customers to directly compare the traditional utility
supplier's prices to those of market alternatives. Id. §§ 48:3-51 to -52. An entire section
of New Jersey's electricity deregulation legislation is dedicated to exit fees. Electric
Discount and Energy Competition Act §28. Section 48:3-77 states:
On-site generators that sell to off-site retail customers in this State
shall be required to pay Societal Benefits Charges (SBC), Market
Transition Charges (MTC), and Transition Bond Charges; existing on-
site generators that sell only to on-site customers are exempt from
paying SBC, MTC, and Transition Bond Charges; provides that on-site
generator facilities, installed after the starting date of retail
competition shall be subject to SBC, MTC, and Transition Bond
Charges if the amount of generation from on-site generators has
reduced the kilowatt hours distributed by an electric public utility to a
level equal to 92.5 percent of the 1999 kilowatt hours distributed by the
electric public utility; and provides that on-site generator facilities
installed after the starting date of retail competition that do not cause
such a reduction shall be exempt from paying the SBC, MTC, and
Transition Bond Charges.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:3-77.25 Id. § 48:3-77(d)(1).
259 See supra notes 8-19 & accompanying text.
260 See infra tbl. 4.
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and many of the local ones.26' As accessory users, unless there are
significant air quality impacts from self-generation, the permitting
process is very streamlined and straightforward.
CONCLUSION
The economics, reliability, and predictability of on-site renewable
energy can be compelling. Moreover, under the Kyoto Protocol, which is
not ratified by the U.S.,262 the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) in eight Eastern states,26 and the federal 1605(b) program,2"
corporations are under increasing pressure to limit their carbon
emissions. Technical impediments and economics are not the major
barriers to renewable power adaptation by businesses. The technology
has evolved faster than the legal and regulatory infrastructure that
supports the technology.
The impediments are regulatory, rather than technical. The
problem manifests in disincentives such as high stand-by power rates,
interconnection difficulties, and exit fees." 5 The countervailing financial
benefits resulting from net metering and RPS renewable energy credits
are not widely known by corporate decision makers. At the state level, it
is a matter of facilitating corporate accessibility to on-site renewable
energy options.
261 Id.
262 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 154.
263 See generally REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MODEL RULE (2006),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model rule_815_06.pdf. Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont have agreed to implement this Model
Rule. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Participating States, http://www.rggi.org/
states.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). See Memorandum of Understanding by Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative 4-5 (Dec. 20, 2005), httpJ/www.rggi.org/docs/mou 1220 05.pdf.21 See Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,169 (Mar.
24, 2005) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 300). Under the program pursuant to Section
1605(d) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, companies can register or report their carbon
emissions or carbon mitigation/sequestration. Id. at 15,170-71. These registered or
reported carbon emissions are not presently tradable in any format pursuant to this
program, but carbon credits can be registered and traded under a program administered
by the Chicago Climate Exchange. See Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicago
climatex.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).2
" See supra Part V.
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TABLE 1
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND TRUST FUNDS IN VANGUARD STATES
266
State Name Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards
Trust Fund
Arizona x
California x x
Connecticut x x
Delaware x x
Illinois x x
Iowa x
Maine x x
Massachusetts x x
Minnesota x x
Montana x x
Nevada x
New Jersey x x
New Mexico x
New York x x
Ohio x
Oregon x
Pennsylvania x x
Rhode Island x x
Texas x
Wisconsin x x
2" This table is modified from a table appearing in Steven Ferrey, Constitutional Barriers
Confronting State Renewable Energy Programs, ENERGY COMM. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n.),
June 2006, at 1, 4.
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TABLE 2
"RENEWABLE" RESOURCES AS DEFINED IN STATE STATUTES
267
Solar Wind Fuel
Cell
Methane/
Landfill
Biomass Trash-
to-
Energy
California
Connecticut
Illinois
Maine
Massachusetts
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Texas
Wisconsin
17 This table is reprinted from Steven Ferrey, Constitutional Barriers Confronting State Ren-
ewable Energy Programs, ENERGY COMM. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n.), June 2006, at 1, 5.
State
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State Hydro Tidal Geothermal Photo- Dedicated
voltaic Crops
California x x x
Connecticut x x
Illinois x x x
Maine x x x x
Massachusetts x x x x
Nevada x x
New Jersey x x x x
New Mexico x x x x
New York x x x x
Oregon x x x x x
Pennsylvania x x x x
Rhode Island x x
Texas x x x x
Wisconsin x x x x
Note:
Photovoltaic is included within solar in some states; methane and or
trash-to-energy may be included within a broad definition of"biomass."
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TABLE 4
OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR LARGER POWER FACILITIES
PERMIT APPLICABILITY
SITING
1. Energy Facility Siting New generating facilities in excess
Board Approval of specified size; Preconstruction
approval.
U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental
Siting Guide, http://www.eere.energy.gov/
femp/technologies/derchp-env-siting.cfrn
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
2. N.E.P.A. For significant environmental
impacts, an EIS is required.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (2006).
AIR
3. New Source All new facilities for major sources
Performance of emissions greater than 250
Standards- MMBtu/hr.
EPA/State
40 C.F.R. § 60.40.
4. Prevention of Emission exceedances greater than
Significant threshold definition of major
Deterioration- source-could apply to particulates,
State as Federal NOx, VOCs, CO. Must perform top-
Delegate of EPA down BACT analysis to justify
technology sources.
40 C.F.R. § 52.21.
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PERMIT APPLICABILITY
5. New Source Any source of oxides of nitrogen or
Review- VOCs in excess of 50 tpy in "serious"
State as Federal area or 25 tpy in "severe" area; will
Delegate of EPA include typical repowering.
Environmental Protection Agency, Clean
Air Act Requirements, http://www.epa.gov/
dfe/pubs/pwb/tech-rep/fedregs/regsecta.htm
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
6. Air Plan Approval Prior Major stationary sources.
to Construction-State
Environmental Protection Agency,
New Source Review: Basic Information,
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/info.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
7. NOx Emission Obtain 120% of potential to emit
Reduction Credits oxides of nitrogen in "serious"
region; 130% in "severe" region.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMPARISON OF
THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW (NSR) REFORM
RULEMAKING PACKAGE AND CURRENT NSR
RULES 24 (1996), http://www.epa.gov/
ttn/nsr/gen/compare.pdf.
8. Obtain Summer For five summer months, must
Ozone Season obtain by the conclusion of each
Allowances-State year, actual budget allowances
scaled to NOx emissions. Must
maintain operating plan with State.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CAP AND TRADE:
NOx PROGRAMS (n.d.), httpJ/www.epa.gov/air
markets/capandtrade/nox.pdf (summarizing
state programs to reduce NOx emissions).
9. Phase II Title IV Compliance filing for any source of SO2
Acid Rain Control and designation of representative.
40 C.F.R. §§ 72.44, 75.4.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLey REV.
PERMIT APPLICABILITY
10. Class I PSD Sources within 100 Km of a Class I
area must do an impact analysis.
See Memorandum from John S. Seitz,
Director, Office of Air Quality Planning
and Standards, Environmental Protection
Agency (Oct. 19, 1992), http://www.epa.gov/
Region7/programs/artd/air/nsr/nsrmemos/
classl.pdf (clarifying prevention of signif-
icant deterioration guidelines).
11. Title V Operating Consolidated air operating permit.
Permit
42 U.S.C. § 7661a (2006).
WATER WITHDRAWAL AND
DISCHARGE
12. NPDES/EPA Region All pollutant point source
discharges to surface water body.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
13. Section 301 Water Discharges to surface water body.
Quality Certification
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
14. Water Withdrawal Any water withdrawal from waters
Permit-State of the state in excess of specified
quantity.
See, e.g., Kentucky Division of Water,
Water Withdrawal Permitting, http:/!
www.water.ky.gov/permitting/ withdrawal/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
15. Coastal Zone Demonstrated consistency with
Management coastal zone management plan
Consistency Review involving intake, outflow, and uses
("CZM") in coastal zone.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c).
[Vol. 31:113
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PERMIT APPLICABILITY
16. Storm Water For construction-phase activities,
Management Plan and if the footprint of existing buildings
Permit is to be enlarged affecting 5 acres
or more, a storm water manage-
ment plan for non-point sources
may be required depending upon
the size of the area affected.
40 C.F.R. § 122.26.
17. Spill Prevention and If oil is to be used and stored as a
Countermeasure back-up fuel, a spill contingency
Plan-EPA plan may be required.
40 C.F.R. § 112.1.
18. Fish and Wildlife Coordination of any impact on
streams.
16 U.S.C. § 661.
19. Wetlands Activities altering or construction
occurring in wetlands, including
coastal wetlands.
33 U.S.C. § 1344; 33 C.F.R. § 320.2.
LocAL PERMITS
20. Industrial Use Permit Discharges to sewers.
See, e.g., 314 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.03 (2006).
21. Zoning and Non- Non-conforming uses and accessory
Conforming Uses uses as-of-right on the existing parcel.
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
General Zoning Permit Information, httpJ/
www.phila.gov/li/faq/zoning/general.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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PERMIT APPLICABILITY
22. Special Use Permits or May be necessary as a prerequisite.
Use Variances
See, e.g., City of Tampa, Florida, Industrial
Zoning District, http://www.tampagov.net/
deptLLandfDevelopment/Zoning/Zoning
Industrial.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
OTHER APPROVALS/ITEMS
23. FERC Added Gas Additional pipeline compression.
Compression
Certification See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N,
CERTIFICATED NATURAL GAS STORAGE
PROJECTS SINCE 2000 (2006), http://
www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/
storage/certificated.pdf; Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Pre-Filing
Environmental Review Process, http://
www.ferc.gov/help/processes/flow/lng- 1. asp
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
24. Gas Transportation Reserve sufficient interruptible or
firm gas transportation for facility.
See generally Northeast Gas Association,
Firm vs. Non-Firm Gas Transportation:
Rationale and Risks, http://www.mass.gov/
Eoca/docs/dte/repgtferop/apph.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describing two types
of gas transportation).
25. Back-up Fuel If oil is going to be used as a back-
Storage (Oil) up fuel, this may have implications
for fuel storage licenses from the
city and state.
See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
17, § 30.3 (2006).
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PERMIT APPLICABILITY
26. Noise Control Could be implicated depending
upon the cooling technology, stack
height and exit velocity, and site
layout.
See Karen D. Durham et al., Noise Abate-
ment for Natural-Draft Burners in U-tube
Equipped Heaters, http://www.natcogroup
.com/PDFContent/Consulting-Research/
TechnicalPapers/Ultra%2OLow%20Noise%
20Paper.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
27. Transmission Prior to physical interconnection or
Interconnection upgrade of interconnection,
facilities need to file an application
and perform a system impact study.
See generally Western Area Power Adminis-
tration, The Interconnection Process, http:ll
www.wapa.gov/transmission/interprocess
.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
28. Federal Aviation GEP and stack approval required if
Administration Stack high new stack near air corridors.
Height Approval
See 14 C.F.R. § 77.13.
